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Abstract—Today organizations are highly interconnected in
business networks called extended enterprises. This is mostly
facilitated by outsourcing and by new economic models based
on pay-as-you-go billing; all supported by IT-as-a-service.
Although outsourcing has been around for some time, what
is now new is the fact that organizations are increasingly
outsourcing critical business processes, engaging on complex
service bundles, and moving infrastructure and their manage-
ment to the custody of third parties. Although this gives com-
petitive advantage by reducing cost and increasing flexibility,
it increases security risks by eroding security perimeters that
used to separate insiders with security privileges from outsiders
without security privileges. The classical security distinction
between insiders and outsiders is supplemented with a third
category of threat agents, namely external insiders, who are not
subject to the internal control of an organization but yet have
some access privileges to its resources that normal outsiders do
not have. Protection against external insiders requires security
agreements between organizations in an extended enterprise.
Currently, there is no practical method that allows security
officers to specify such requirements. In this paper we provide
a method for modeling an extended enterprise architecture,
identifying external insider roles, and for specifying security
requirements that mitigate security threats posed by these roles.
We illustrate our method with a realistic example.
Keywords-Extended Enterprise Architecture, Governance,
Security Agreement, External Insider Threat, Value Modeling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, organizations are highly interconnected with other
organizations, creating business networks variously called
value constellations, value webs, value chains or extended
enterprises. This is mostly facilitated by outsourcing activ-
ities that used to be performed in-house, by new economic
models based on pay-as-you-go billing and IT-as-a-service,
by new technologies such as virtualization, and by fast
and reliable communication over the Internet. Although
outsourcing has been around for a couple of decades, what is
now new is the fact that organizations are increasingly out-
sourcing critical business processes, engaging on complex
service bundles, and moving infrastructure to other private,
shared or even public networks under the custody of third-
parties. Extended enterprises provide competitive advantage
by allowing cost savings and increasing business flexibility;
each participant in an extended enterprise specializes on its
*Supported by the research program Sentinels (www.sentinels.nl).
core competencies and takes advantage of other organiza-
tions’ specialities to deliver its business mission.
However, as observed by the Open Group’s Jericho Fo-
rum,1 extended enterprises erode organizational boundaries
and therefore security perimeters. Data storage, management
and processing migrates to the custody of other organizations
in the extended enterprise, but the organization that owns
the data remains accountable for its protection, regardless
of where and by whom it is handled. This creates a gover-
nance problem, that we will call the external insider threat
problem.
In a single enterprise, people either are insiders, who
have an employment contract with the organization and
accordingly have some privileged access to the organiza-
tion’s resources, or they are outsiders without such privileged
access. Insiders are trusted and have access permissions, but
also fall under the internal control of the organization in
which the proper exercise of these permissions is verified,
for example by monitoring behavior and by log analysis;
outsiders are not trusted and have no access permissions, and
they do not fall under the internal control of the organization.
Organizations protect themselves against outsiders by erect-
ing a so called security perimeter, based on firewalls, and
by using security mechanisms such as Intrusion Detection
Systems and Vulnerability Scanners.
If an organization is embedded in an extended enterprise,
as most organizations nowadays are, they must deal with a
third category of people, that we call external insiders [1],
who are not employed by the organization and do not fall
under the internal control of the organization, but never-
theless have some privileges just like insiders. Examples
are employees of business partners, and outsourcing service
providers. Classical internal control is not possible here,
because these employees work with IT that is monitored
or logged by another organization, and classical protection
against outsiders is not sufficient, because external insiders
have legal access privileges.
The solution is to specify security agreements with other
companies in an extended enterprise in which particular
security risk mitigation measures are demanded from the
other party. For example, ISO 27002 requires specification
of security agreements [2]. However, there currently is
1http://www.opengroup.org/jericho/.
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no method for identifying the security requirements to be
included in such agreements. For several reasons, identifying
such requirements is complex. First, modern companies
may deal with hundreds of other organizations, and the
complete extended enterprise in which the company operates
is simply too complex to model. Not only is it too complex,
information about which companies are part of the extended
enterprise is hard to find. So a method to identify security
agreements must not rely on a model of the entire extended
enterprise.
Second, if we restrict our extended enterprise model to the
few companies involved in providing a particular business
service, we must deal with the problem of finite budgets:
Any company has only a finite security budget and therefore
only some of the necessary security mitigations can be taken.
If a company requires another company that it does business
with to take a security measure, then that company will raise
the price of whatever it is providing, which negates the major
reason to participate in an extended enterprise: reducing cost.
But if a company does not require the other company to take
a security measure, then it will simply have to trust that
company. This increases the security risks in transactions
with that company if some employees in that companies
turn out not to be trustworthy after all, and in addition
it may be a source of non-compliance with governance
regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Security risk
and non-compliance are also costs. Therefore, a method for
specifying security agreements in extended enterprises must
be a method for supporting negotiations in which a company
can trade off the cost of specifying a security requirement
against the cost of trusting another company.
Third, the method must be usable by security officers
against acceptable effort, which in the current cost-aware
climate means that it must be easy to use. The solution
that we propose in this paper relies on a multiperspective
architecture model of the extended enterprise.
We will achieve complexity reduction by using value
modeling to zoom in on the part of the network needed
to satisfy a particular customer need (Section II). Using
the value approach, we have made a catalog of common
relationships between companies in extended enterprises of
manufacturing companies (Section III). These relationships
are our first step in identifying different kinds of external
insiders. We then illustrate our method by analyzing one
of these roles in detail, namely the manufacturer-retailer
relationship (Section IV). Basically, we model an extended
enterprise from a value perspective, coordination perspective
and IT architecture perspective, and use this to identify
external insiders, sensitive data, and confidentiality threats
posed by this. We then show how to mitigate these risks by
including mitigation requirements in a security agreement,
and which role external insiders play in posing the threats
as well as in implementing the mitigations.
II. VALUE MODELING OF EXTENDED ENTERPRISES
In this paper we take the point of view of one company
in an extended enterprise, which we will call the focal
company. To avoid having to model an entire extended
enterprise, we focus on a particular need of a customer of
the focal company, and we make a high-level architecture
model of only the companies that cooperate with the focal
company to serve that need. This typically reduces the size
of the network from a few hundred companies to only a
handful.
We use value modeling to represent the part of the
extended enterprise required to serve this need, using
e3value [3]. An e3value model allows us to show how a
customer need is served by the cooperation of a number of
companies, and also includes the customer in the model. In
this section we summarize the e3value modeling technique.
Figure 1 shows a value model of a simplified manufacturer-
retailer relationship.
zoomRetailer-Manufacturer, 2010-03-17 11:57:04, http://www.e3value.com/
 manufacturer retailer
end consumer
product
payment
Figure 1. Value model of a simplified manufacturer-retailer relationship
Manufacturer and retailer are actors, i.e. stakeholders with
an economic role. Actors have value interfaces represented
by the bean-like shape which contain in and out ports (trian-
gles) indicating the direction that a value object is transferred
from one actor to another. Value objects can be anything
with value for the stakeholders involved such as money-
related objects, deliverables, or more intangible objects such
as legal compliance. In the figure, the manufacturer transfers
end-consumer product in exchange for payment transferred
back by the retailer.
Value models should also contain at least one start-
stimulus (filled circle) and one end-stimulus (filled circle
with a halo). In the example, retailers have a need (start-
stimulus) to be fulfilled by another actor in the model:
manufactures. However, this is only accomplished if the
stimulus is connected through a dependency path (dotted
line) to an actor’s value interface. Sometimes it may be
important to show on a value model that an actor is a
broker-like actor; it means that its strength is to transfer
value objects between other actors via a dependency path.
Dependency paths can also contain “and” (a line with dots)
and “or” (a triangle with dots) constructs to represent choice
or joint connections, as we will see later.
The underlying principle behind a value model is reci-
procity, that sustains the delivery of each actor mission.
As shown in Figure 1, on the one hand, the manufacturer
will only deliver end-consumer products upon an agreement
of payment via an invoice to the retailer. On the other
2
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hand, the retailer will only pay (the invoice) if the end-
consumer products specified on its purchase order have
been delivered accordingly. This reciprocity is more visible
between profitable driven actors, and less visible when it
involves governmental actors, for example.
III. BUSINESS ROLES IN EXTENDED ENTERPRISES
Although our method is claimed to be general, we will
consider only the case where the focal company is a
manufacturing company. Analysis of a number of existing
manufacturing extended enterprises has revealed a small
number of frequently occurring roles of companies. This is
our entry point for identifying external insiders who play a
role in this part of the extended enterprise. In this section
we list these roles, and as an illustration provide an e3value
model for one of them.
A. Trading Partners
Trading partners are organizations the manufacturer trades
with to perform the value-adding primary activities of
its value chain, in Michael Porter’s terminology [4]. One
characteristic of such partners is the exchange of business
transactions via Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) [5]. EDI
are formatted messages that represent documents necessary
to coordinate trading between two parties. We will see some
examples of EDI documents when we model our running
example, the manufacturer-retail relationship in Section IV.
The value model in Figure 2 shows three types of man-
ufacturer trading partners, described next. These are broad
views of the value relationships; we will see in Section IV,
for example, that the relationship manufacturer-retailer in
fact involves many other organizations and also directly
involves another type of trading partner (i.e. warehouse &
carrier) to realize the relationship seen in this model.
1) Customers
Customers are organizations that buy products from
the manufacturer. They can basically be of two types:
a) Retailers (or dealers) are organizations that act
as a broker in the sense that they buy from
the manufacturer for resale. The relationships
between manufacturer and retailer, and between
retailer and end consumer are explicit in the
value model in terms of the value objects “end
consumer product” and “payment”.
b) Professional customers are organizations that buy
from the manufacturer for the benefit of its own
end consumers. For example, a car manufacturer
can trade with car dealers that resell family
cars to end consumers, but can also trade utility
vehicles, such as ambulances, with healthcare
institutions. In the value model shown in Fig-
ure 2, we make the distinction between these two
classes in terms of the value objects they buy,
i.e., “end consumer product” and “professional
product”.
2) Suppliers
Suppliers are organizations that provide the manufac-
turer with bill-of-material2 goods. Therefore, in this
case the manufacturer is the buyer while suppliers are
the sellers. In the value model shown in Figure 2,
we see that the payment flows from manufacturer to
supplier in exchange for bill-of-material goods.
3) Warehouse and carriers
Warehouse and carriers are the main components of
logistics, in this case, outbound logistics [4]. The
commercial relationship between manufacturer and
warehouse & carrier is explicit in the value model
shown in Figure 2. The manufacturer pays in exchange
for storage and transport of its products.
tradingPartners_v1, 2010-03-22 22:49:37, http://www.e3value.com/
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Figure 2. Typical trading partners of a manufacturer
The trading partners value model also shows that end
consumers and professional customers have start-stimuli,
i.e., they have consumption needs. End consumers, as rep-
resented, can choose from alternative paths, either buy at
retailers or buy directly from the manufacturer web store,
for example. Retailers play the role of brokers, and suppliers
and logistics fulfill the customer needs of the manufacturer
itself.
B. Service Providers
Part of a manufacturer extended enterprise are service
providers; in this case the manufacturer is mainly a services
client. However, a manufacturer can also play the role of
service provider. For example, Xerox3, a manufacturer of
copiers, printers, and supplies such as toner cartridges and
2Products essential for building the products sold by the manufacturer.
3http://www.xerox.com
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paper, provides a number of business services to organiza-
tional clients such as enterprise print services and document
management services.
There are two main types of service providers: business
process providers and support service providers. Although
it may seem this distinction relates to Porter’s distinction
between primary and support activities in a value chain [4],
such relation does not exist. A business process can be
related either to a primary activity (e.g., sales) or to a support
activity (e.g. human resource management).
Regardless of the service provider type, in all cases the
value exchange between service provider and client is the
same: payment is transferred from client to provider in
exchange for service, transferred from provider to client.
1) Business process providers
Business process providers deliver an entire business
process, i.e., a series of related tasks with a specific
purpose delivered as a service. Business processes can
be related to front-office or to back-office processes.
The former are processes externally visible either
to the outside world or to the extended enterprise;
examples are call centers, and recruitment & selection
services. On the contrary, back-office processes are not
visible externally; examples are accounting, finance
and salary administration.
2) Support service providers
These service providers deliver services that support
business processes, or involve facilities and infras-
tructure. These services can be related to Information
Technology (IT) or not. Examples of IT support ser-
vices are network management, data center operations,
and software maintenance. While examples of non-
IT support services are cleaning, catering, physical
security, telephone/water/power supply.
C. Business Partners
Another class of B2B relationship that happens on the
extended enterprise of a typical manufacturer refers to busi-
ness partners. We identify basically two types of business
partners, described next.
1) Co-development partners
This type of business partner relationship appears
when a product is manufactured; this includes software
development organizations that manufacture software-
products. In this case, the partner receives a payment
in exchange for a design or specification. Most of the
times, customers and consumers of the manufacturer
products do not become aware of such partnerships.
2) Business complementary partners
This type of business partner relationship comple-
ments each others’ products to deliver a combined
solution or product to customers and consumers. A
typical example is the more apparent partnership be-
tween hardware manufacturers and software develop-
ers to deliver, for example, laptops and desktops with
operating system already installed and licensed.
D. Administration
A manufacturer extended enterprise also comprehends
a class of B2B relationship that we call generically
“administration”. We identify three types of business-to-
administration relationships:
1) External auditors
External auditors fulfil a customer need from a man-
ufacturer; the value objects they exchange are auditor
statement for payment. A SAS 70 (Types 1 and 2,
for Service Organizations) [6]4 statement issued by
independent auditors is an example.
2) Regulatory bodies
Regulatory bodies also fulfil a customer need from a
manufacturer; they issue certifications of legal com-
pliance in exchange for payment. For example, man-
ufacturers are only able to trade their products in the
European market if their products have a CE marking.
Depending whether these products are of high risk
for public safety, then they have to be assessed by a
Notified Body. As such, certain medical devices need
to be assessed by notified inspection bodies against
the Council Directive 93/42/EEC [7] before they can
receive a CE marking.
3) Government agencies
Manufacturers have to comply with local and federal
governmental agencies needs in exchange for legal
compliance. For example, manufacturers have to pay
taxes such as VAT (Value-Added Tax), and have to
provide data (e.g., statistics and reports) to agen-
cies such as the Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S.
Department of Commerce5) used for governmental
statistics [8].
E. Competitors
Competitors represent the last class of B2B relationships
identified from the perspective of a manufacturer. In this
case, customers such as retailers and professional customers
as well as end consumers have the choice of buying from the
manufacturer or its competitors to fulfil the same customer
needs.
IV. A METHOD FOR IDENTIFYING EXTERNAL INSIDER
THREAT MITIGATIONS
A security agreement between the focal company and
some other company consists of a specification of security
risk mitigations to be taken by the other company. This
4SAS 70 [6] type 1 reports an auditor opinion about whether relevant
policies and procedures were placed in operation as of a specific date, and
type 2 reports whether such policies and procedures were in fact operating
effectively, according to tests performed.
5http://www.bea.gov/
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Figure 3. Model showing the value exchanges among parties
mitigation specification is a requirement; the security agree-
ment states that the other company must comply with this
requirement.
In order to identify mitigations of risks posed by external
insiders, we first need to identify these external insiders.
In the method proposed here, we do this by first making
a value model of the part of the extended enterprise that
cooperates to serve a particular customer need of the focal
company. This reduces the network to a manageable size,
and also shows between which pairs of companies a security
agreement may be needed. Next, we make a model of
coordination activities needed to serve the need, and of
the IT architecture required to support these activities. This
allows us to identify external insiders in this part of the
network, the activities that they legitimately must perform
in order to do their job, and the sensitive data they have
access to. This also allows us to provide a list of threats
posed by these external insiders, and of mitigations of these
threats. We illustrate our method with the manufacturer-
retailer business relationship presente in Section II, where
we incorporate the additional roles that we have identified
so that we get a realistic model.
A. Value Modeling
Figure 3 shows the value model of a manufacturer-retailer
relation where five other actors (organizations) are involved.
We see (i) two trading partners of the manufacturer (the
retailer itself and the logistics partner), (ii) three service
providers of the manufacturer (the call center business
process provider and two IT support service providers), and
(iii) one administration organization (the Tax Office).
The retailer transfers a payment to the manufacturer in
exchange for the products ordered. However, the delivery of
these products happens via a logistics partner (warehouse
& carrier) of the manufacturer. Therefore, the manufacturer
transfers a payment to the warehouse/carrier in exchange
for storage & transport of products. The manufacturer has
to collect taxes when selling products and, as a consequence,
the manufacturer has to transfer taxes to the Tax Office in
exchange for legal compliance. Moreover, the manufacturer
transfers payments to service providers in exchange for dif-
ferent types of services. Hence, the model shows exchanges
of payment by service between the manufacturer and the
call center, the EDI-managed and the data center & SAP-
managed service providers.
Although the value model provides an overview of B2B
relationships that play an important role in realizing the
main business interaction between manufacturer and retailer,
it does not provide an overview of sequencing that those
parties have to follow. That is why we also need to model
the coordination perspective; we do that next.
B. Coordination Modeling
As already mentioned when trading partners were dis-
cussed in Section III-A, EDI (Electronic Data Interchange)
documents are the basis upon which trading partners co-
operate, therefore coordinate, their operations. Coordination
between different parties of the value chain is a key aspect
for the order process fulfilment [9]. Figure 4 shows the main
coordinated interactions between the trading parties involved
in a simple sequence diagram. We omitted the activities of
the three service providers since there is no coordination
involving those parties.
The whole process starts when a retailer issues an EDI-
based Purchase Order (PO) to the manufacturer (step 1 in
Figure 4). The order specifies which products the retailer
wants to purchase and in which quantities. This triggers
activities on the manufacturer side related to the approval
of the PO. After approval, an EDI-based Shipment Advice
is sent from the manufacturer to the warehouse (step 2).
In general terms, it is an indication for the warehouse to
get ready to release the products listed on the PO from
stock. This triggers activities related to the replenishment
of the manufacturer stock, such as those related to resource
planning and purchase orders to suppliers. The manufac-
turer also sends an EDI-based Shipment Order (step 3) to
the carrier. This document alerts the carrier to be ready
to transport the products to the retailer, again triggering
5
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Figure 4. Model showing the main coordination activities among the
trading parties.
activities related to the manufacturer inventory management.
Inventory may aggregate, for example, stock information
from more than one warehouse, and from the final stage of
production. Next, the manufacturer usually sends an EDI-
based Shipment Notice to the retailer with details related to
the delivery of the products (step 4), followed by an EDI-
based invoice (step 5). The invoice triggers the update of
accounts receivable on the manufacturer side. The next two
steps involve the delivery of products at the retailer address
(step 6) executed by the carrier that transports these products
from the warehouse to the retailer, and the actual payment
of the products received to the manufacturer (step 7). The
last step (step 8) refers to the payment of taxes to the Tax
Office, performed by the manufacturer, and triggers finance
and accounting back-office activities for the manufacturer.
The coordination model shows the main sequence of
interactions between the trading partners and the manufac-
turer. However, several back-office activities are triggered
on the manufacturer side that are still not visible on the
coordination model. Also, in order to assess external insider
threat, we need to know which IT resources are involved in
these activities. Therefore, in the following section we model
the IT architecture that supports this coordination including
the activities triggered.
C. IT Architecture Modeling
Figure 5 shows an IT architecture that realizes both the
value and the coordination models presented previously. Any
architecture notation understandable by the stakeholders is
acceptable here. The diagram in figure 5 essentially shows
different parties (organizational boundaries), communication
channels linking these parties, and user functionalities.
One interesting aspect to notice is the fact that the trading
partners and service providers present on the value model
(Figure 3) are also part of the IT architecture diagram, but
not the manufacturer itself. This is because the front- and
back-office activities mentioned on the coordination model
(Figure 4) are performed by IT support service providers
and by a business process provider on the behalf of the
manufacturer.
As seen before, the starting point is a Purchase Order
(PO). Retailer employees can place PO in two ways. They
can use the manufacturer sales portal, not only to place
but also to manage their orders. Alternatively, they can
use the manufacturer call center and ask a sales desk
employee to place and manage their orders; in this case,
the retailer employees have to manage their orders through
the call center. The EDI-based documents, such as a PO,
are usually transmitted via AS2 (Applicability Statement
2). AS2 is a standard which defines secure transmission
over HTTP, used to send and receive EDI files over the
Internet. AS2 connections require certificates issued by a
Certificate Authority [10] from both parties involved and use
encryption for data transmission. The PO transmitted by the
retailer or the sales desk employee is therefore sent via AS2
connection to the EDI system located on the manufacturer
data center. The EDI system basically processes the EDI
files, that has to be integrated with the manufacturer ERP
(Enterprise Resource Planning) infrastructure. In this exam-
ple, we assume (quite reasonably) that the manufacturer has
a SAP ERP6. The integration between EDI system and SAP
ERP requires an interface based on SAP IDoc (Intermediate
Document) technology; via this IDocs interface documents
are transferred from EDI system to ERP systems and vice-
versa.
After the PO is approved, several exchanges of EDI-
based files occur between the ERP infrastructure of the
retailer, warehouse/carrier and the manufacturer, as shown
in Figure 3. For example, employees from the logistics
partner, i.e. the warehouse and carrier employees, will have
an EDI interface to access their EDI system (logistics EDI
system) used to manage shipping advices and shipping
orders, respectively. The activities triggered at each step
of the whole process are performed by different business
applications part of the manufacturer ERP infrastructure. For
example, step 5 in Figure 3 involves SAP Financials to issue
the invoice and send the EDI-based invoice automatically to
the retailer, and to update the receivable accounts.
The manufacturer’s legacy EDI system (located on its data
center) is managed remotely by a service provider, as often
happens in practice and illustrated in the diagram in Figure 5.
Therefore, their employees basically perform tasks related
6http://www.sap.com/solutions/business-suite/erp
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Figure 5. Model showing an IT architecture that realizes the value and the coordination models presented in Figures 3 and 4, respectively
to: (i) maintenance of the EDI system and (ii) monitoring
of EDI daily transactions. EDI maintenance involves tasks
related to disaster recovery such as archive of EDI data
and backup of EDI software; while EDI daily monitoring
involves tracking EDI error messages and repair or resume
transmission [11]. The manufacturer’s ERP (platform and
applications), including databases (data) and the sales portal
(SAP web application and web server), as well as the
IT infrastructure, are all assumed to be managed, in this
example, by a same service provider. We identify in the
diagram a few actors that play a role on the tasks that
such provider has to perform. For example, we identify
data center employees responsible for network adminis-
tration, and SAP experts responsible for monitoring daily
SAP operations; we also identify the role of dba (database
administrator). Additionally, it becomes clear when we think
about on-site vendor support for hardware that the data
center operations service provider also has its own extended
enterprise.
D. Identifying External Insiders
All the actors in the IT architecture diagram are external
insiders with respect to the focal company, the manufacturer.
The diagram also illustrates why external insiders can be
a security problem: For example, the manufacturer cannot
know whether call center employees who have left their job
have had their digital identity and access revoked or not,
and how quickly. This represents a threat because a detected
incident can bring consequences not only for the service
provider in terms of liability but can also bring consequences
to the service client organization. An illustration is the
Citibank fraud revealed in 2005 [12]. Investigation showed
that Citibank account holders were affected when their
money were transferred by three former employees of its call
center provider, raising questions not only about identity and
access management, but also about the rate of turnover and
screening procedures at outsourced call center providers.
Our IT architecture model provides a list of external
insiders in the manufacturer-retailer example.
1) retailer employees that place and manage purchase
orders
2) sales desk employees that also place and manage
purchase orders on the behalf of the manufacturer’s
customers
3) logistics employees that manage shipment advices and
manage shipping orders sent by the manufacturer for
coordination involved with the delivery of products for
the retailer
4) EDI-managed service provider employees that main-
tain the manufacturer EDI system, and monitor EDI
daily transactions
5) infrastructure-responsible employees at the retailer,
call center, logistics, and EDI-managed service
provider
7
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6) data center employees that perform basically two
roles: network administration and SAP business ap-
plications administration
7) database administrators also from the data center
8) on-site vendor support individuals that manage data
center specific hardware
Interesting to observe is the fact that external insiders,
on the one hand, pose security threats to the manufacturer
but, on the other hand, they can be in a position to enforce
mitigations on the behalf of the manufacturer. This happens
when the activity they perform has been outsourced. We look
at threats and mitigations next.
E. Specifying Threat Mitigations
What threats do these external insiders pose? The main
security attribute at risk is confidentiality. Therefore, we
take a data-centric approach for the analysis of threats and
mitigations, and classify the threats according to the data
states recognized by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) [13], that applies to organiza-
tions handling health data. According to HIPAA, there are
the four data states: (i) data in motion, i.e. data in transit
through a network, (ii) data at rest, i.e. data stored, (iii)
data in use, i.e. data in process of being created, retrieved,
updated or deleted, and (iv) data disposed, i.e. data discarded
or recycled. Protecting sensitive data in each of these states
becomes security goals, and this is our starting point for
identifying threats.
Next, we identify sensitive data using the IT architecture
shown in Figure 5. Sensitive data, in this particular example,
includes:
• customer-specific price lists for manufacturer products,
• trading EDI-based documents,
• customer personal data, and
• credentials such as certificates to transmit EDI docu-
ments,
• decryption keys,
• passwords to log on the sales manufacturer portal, and
• administrative passwords to manage infrastructure and
business applications (e.g. ERP environment, database,
legacy EDI system) at the data center.
In order to identify realistic mitigations (using technology
currently in use by companies) we follow a backward
reasoning from best practice mitigations to threats that they
can mitigate. Our starting point here is the Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [14] (also a data-
centric standard), which we apply to sensitive data rather
than to credit card holders data. Each PCI requirement is a
possible mitigation to be included in a security agreement,
and we analyze whether external insiders listed in the
previous section would pose threat, and would be responsible
to mitigate that threat. The results are shown in Table I. We
support this analysis by recent investigations on cases of
data breaches reported by 7Safe (2010) [15] and Verizon
(2009) [16].
The outcome of Table I is twofold. First, it provides miti-
gations against external insider threat, useful for addressing
security in third party agreements, as mandated by ISO
27002 [2]. Second, it lists not only the external insiders
who pose threats, but also the external insiders that must
implement mitigations. This provides additional support
for negotiating about inclusion of mitigation measures in
security agreements.
V. RELATED WORK
The three perspectives (value, coordination, IT archi-
tecture) used in this paper to identify classes of external
insiders has been proposed by Gordijn and Akkermans [3]
and Wieringa et. al [17]. We have no particular choice of
coordination and IT architecture modeling techniques and
assume that companies using this method have their own
preferred modeling techniques.
The need for security agreements in extended enterprises
is a best practice listed in the ISO 27002 [2] code of
practice for information security management (Section 6).
However, ISO 27002 does not provide guidelines for doing
so, and this paper is the first to provide such a method. An
important difference between our approach and ISO 27002,
though, is that we focus on threats rather than risks because
in extended enterprises it is difficult to get information to
assess risks, because it involves prior knowledge of existing
vulnerabilities.
Enterprise governance frameworks are also related to our
work. For example, the Control Objectives for Information
and related Technology (COBIT) [18] contains controls for
IT management. It contains a process under the domain
of “Delivery and Support” that covers Manage Third-party
Services, but again it is too broad and aims at monitoring
of service delivery, not really on the security aspect. The
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) [19] focus on management in more
general terms, and related to financial reporting. Here too
our method can be used to satisfy these requirements.
Our work uses data-centric security standards that or-
ganizations have to be compliant with, depending on the
type of data they handle. The Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [13] and Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [14] are the
basis for our security goals and mitigations considered when
reasoning about external insiders threats, in Section IV-E.
Our work contributes to the specification of Service Level
Agreements (SLAs). However, SLAs address the delivery of
services in terms of measurable indicators that guarantee the
quality of services (QoS) delivered. While some attributes
of security can be specified in an SLA, such as availability
of services, others cannot not, such as confidentiality and
integrity. Confidentiality requirements must be specified in
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the form of mitigation measures in security agreements that
can be appended to SLAs.
VI. SUMMARY AND FURTHER WORK
We have provided and illustrated a method for modeling
an extended enterprise from three perspectives, namely the
commercial value, the coordination, and the IT architecture
perspective, and to identify external insider threats and
mitigations in this network. This provides useful information
for security officers who must negotiate security agreements
with other companies in an extended enterprise, because it
shows the source of threats as well as the sources responsible
to mitigate these threats. Use of value modeling allows us to
restrict modeling to a manageable small part of the extended
enterprise, which is the first requirement of the method listed
in section I. Motivating the threats and mitigations in terms
of the extended enterprise architecture provides support for
making trade-offs between mitigating the threat, increasing
the price of cooperation, and trusting the threat not to materi-
alize, increasing the risk of sensitive data disclosure and non-
compliance. Finally, our third requirement is ease of use.
This is notoriously difficult to validate. E3value modeling
has been used mostly by researchers (www.e3value.com),
so this is the biggest obstacle to transferring this method
to practice. More realistic is the use of this technique by a
trained consultant to support a security officer.
In order to validate the method in practice using an
action case study approach [20], we will use it to per-
form insider threat analyses using other scenarios from
manufacturing companies. Initial experience with real-world
cases has indicated that the usability of the method would
be enhanced if support for access path analysis would be
provided. Moreover, to generalize the method, we will use it
in economic sectors other than manufacturing, for example,
in the healthcare domain.
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Security
Goal
External Insiders that Pose Threat Mitigation Best Practice External Insiders that Miti-
gate Threat
Protect
sensitive
data in
motion
Unmanaged firewalls such as personal firewalls
on desktops used by retailer, sales desk and
logistics employees are a source of threat
Firewalls should be installed and maintained
to filter traffic of sensitive data; this involves
management of inbound and outbound traffic
of network firewalls, personal firewalls, virtual
machines firewalls, when the data center uses a
shared hosting environment
Infrastructure-responsible em-
ployees at data center and at
each party
Use of communication channels such as unen-
crypted email, peer-to-peer, and wireless con-
nections for intentional or unintentional trans-
mission of sensitive data such as customer-
specific price lists and customer data by sales
desk employee are a source of threat
Encrypt transmission of sensitive data across
open, public networks
Infrastructure-responsible em-
ployees at each party need to
restrict the availability of un-
safe communication channels,
e.g. for sales desk employees
Logs collected but not managed is a common
practice (according to Verizon investigation);
logs not analyzed at different parties cause a
threat from all parties of undetected unautho-
rized access and misuse of sensitive data
Logs should be collected and analyzed not only
at the OS and network levels but also at the level
of application, anti-virus, database; analysis may
involve correlation of information from different
logs
Infrastructure-responsible
and applications-responsible
employees at data center
and infrastructure-responsible
employees at each other party
Protect
sensitive
data at rest
Certificates for EDI transmission and decryption
keys are stored at the retailer, call center and
logistics organizations could be source of threat;
passwords to sales portal and VPN e.g., should
not be stored but could be kept unsafe by em-
ployees involved in their manipulation at every
party including by the data center employees
Sensitive data should be stored in an unreadable
way, i.e. encrypted and decryption keys should
be locked in a safe, not logically nearby location
The same external insiders that
may cause threat
Anti-virus are usually installed at users desk-
tops/laptops but often not installed at servers for
performance reasons, according to 7Safe inves-
tigation; threat comes from every party involved
Up-to-date anti-virus should be present and reg-
ularly updated not only on client desktops but
also on servers hosting applications
Infrastructure-responsible em-
ployees at data center and at
each party
Vulnerable desktops used by retailer, call center,
logistics, and EDI-managed employees can rep-
resent source of malware that exposes sensitive
data; EDI system is a special threat because
legacy systems are known to be difficult to patch
Vulnerability patches and software updates
should be managed
Infrastructure-responsible em-
ployees at data center and at
each party
Protect
sensitive
data in use
Guessable login/passwords are a source of threat
from data center employees, retailer, call center,
logistics and EDI-managed employees
Vendor-supplied defaults for system pass-
words and other security parameters should be
changed; such passwords and security parame-
ters span across the infrastructure level and the
business application level
The same external insiders that
may cause threat, but specially
infrastructure-responsible
employees at each party,
and applications-responsible
employees at data center
A same employee handling the same tasks for
different customers, e.g. sales desk employees;
and separation-of-duty conflicts between tasks
handled by a same employee, e.g. retailer em-
ployee that places purchase orders and approves
payment of invoices represent threats
Individuals should only have the authorizations
they need to perform their duties (need-to-know
security principle)
Requires supervision and re-
view of access control lists;
external insider responsible
should be appointed at con-
tracted parties
The use of functional logins (same user ID) or
shared password (same password for different
ID) often happens in practice, according to Ver-
izon and 7Safe investigations; retailer, logistics
and call center employees may cause this threat
Every individual should be hold accountable to
her actions; this means that actions should be
traceable
Requires supervision and re-
view of access control lists;
external insider responsible
should be appointed at con-
tracted parties
Employees that handle EDI-based documents
(e.g. retailer and logistics employees) and call
center employees that handle customer personal
data & customer-specific price list often print
and archive information, and this is a source of
threats; vendor support employees with physical
access to hardware parts are also threats
Physical access to sensitive data should be re-
stricted; this also involves protecting distribution
of data, e.g., via email, hardcopy, portable de-
vices
Requires supervision at each
party; external insider respon-
sible should be appointed at
contracted parties
Poor security culture among employees, low
level of security training, deficient screening
practices; retailer, call center and logistics are
potential source of threat
A policy that addresses information security,
security awareness and training should be en-
forced, as well as strict selection and recruitment
procedures
Requires auditing at each party
Protect
sensitive
data
disposed
Retailer, logistics and call center employees may
dispose of hardcopy of sensitive data such as
customer-specific price list, customer personal
data, trading documents; vendor support em-
ployees that replaces hardware parts are also a
source of threat
Data disposed should be rendered unusable, un-
readable or undecipherable; this involves phys-
ical or electronic data that should either be
destroyed or disposed encrypted
Requires supervision at each
party; external insider respon-
sible should be appointed at
contracted parties
Table I
ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL INSIDERS IN TERMS OF WHO POSES THREATS AND WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ENFORCING MITIGATIONS TO COUNTER THESE
THREATS ON THE BEHALF OF THE MANUFACTURER
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